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Binary Pebbling Algorithms for In-Place Reversal of One-Way Hash Chains
The resourcefulness of people working in the area
of cryptology is striking. A wonderfully diverse set
of professionals capable of generating an almost
endless stream of new, intriguing research prob-
lems and, fortunately—driven by the ever faster
changing playing field of our information society
and infrastructure under attack—capable of find-
ing many ingenious and compelling solutions as
well.
Unsurprisingly, mathematics plays a central role
in cryptology along with computer science. The al-
gorithmic problem chosen as the topic of this paper
has a unique motivation in cryptography. At the
core of its solution lies an intricate fractal struc-
ture which turns out to have a very nice and simple
characterization.
The problem is formulated in terms of a length-preserving
one-way function f . A concrete example is the classical
Davies-Meyer one-way function constructed from a block
cipher such as AES:
f :
{
{0, 1}128 −→ {0, 1}128
x 7−→ AESx(0).
That is, f(x) is computed as an AES encryption of the triv-
ial all-zero message 0 under the key x, which can obviously
be done efficiently. On the other hand, recovering x from
f(x) is tantamount to recovering an AES key given a single
plaintext-ciphertext pair, which is assumed to be computa-
tionally hard. Therefore, f is called a one-way function,
as it is easy to evaluate but hard to invert. Block ciphers
like AES are normally used for symmetric encryption to
provide confidentiality, whereas one-way functions like f
are often used for asymmetric authentication, e.g., in the
construction of digital signature schemes.
One-way chains
Back in 1981, Lamport (the “LA” in LATEX) proposed an
elegant asymmetric identification scheme which operates
in terms of one-way chains [12]. A one-way chain is the
sequence formed by the successive iterates of f for a given
value. For example, in a client-server setting, the client
may apply f four times for a randomly chosen 128-bit seed
value x0 to obtain a length-4 chain:
x0
f
−→ x1
f
−→ x2
f
−→ x3
f
−→ x4.
Lamport’s identification scheme then operates as fol-
lows. At the start, the client registers itself securely with
the server, as a result of which the server associates the
endpoint x4 with the client. Depending on the details, this
registration step may be rather involved. However, from
now on the client may identify itself securely to the server
simply by releasing the next preimage on the chain. In the
first round of identification, the client releases preimage x3,
and the server checks this value by testing if f(x3) = x4
holds. An eavesdropper obtaining x3 cannot impersonate
the client later on because the next round the server will
demand a preimage for x3. At this stage, preimage x2 sat-
isfying f(x2) = x3 is known only to the client; it is not
even known to the server yet, which is why the scheme
provides asymmetric authentication.
One-way chains and variations thereof are often referred
to as hash chains since cryptographic hash functions such
as SHA-256 are commonly used as alternatives for f . Hash
chains are fundamental to many constructions in cryptog-
raphy, and even to some forms of cryptanalysis (e.g., rain-
bow tables). Bitcoin’s blockchain [15] is probably the best-
known example of a hash chain nowadays—but note that
blockchains are costly to generate due to the additional
“proof of work” requirement for the hash values linking
successive blocks. Hash chains are also used in digital sig-
nature schemes required to be quantum secure, building on
work by Merkle from 1979 [14]. Incidentally, Merkle at-
tributes the use of iterated functions to Winternitz. How-
ever, Winternitz’s idea is to use only one preimage on a
length-n chain, basically to securely encode an integer in
the set {0, . . . , n− 1}, whereas Lamport’s idea is to use all
of the n preimages. The CAFE phone-tick scheme [2, Sec-
tion 3.5] (see also [17]) and later micropayment schemes
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(e.g., PayWord [19]) actually combine these two ideas. In
the case of phone-ticks, the caller releases the endpoint of
a chain at the start of a call; at each tick, the caller simply
releases the next preimage (as in Lamport’s scheme) to
pay for continuing the call. After the call ends, the phone
company only needs to keep the last preimage released
by the caller to claim the amount due (as in Winternitz’s
encoding).
Security of one-way chains
The use of a cryptographic hash function to create a one-
way chain is overkill, however. A function like SHA-256
is not just one-way but is also designed to compress bit
strings of practically unlimited length, and related to this,
SHA-256 is required to be collision-resistant as well. For
the security of a one-way chain, f should be one-way, that
is, given y in the range of f it must be hard to find any x
such that f(x) = y. Or rather, as recognized in [13, 17],
f should necessarily be one-way on its iterates, which
says that, for a length-n chain, given an nth iterate image
y (in the range of fn) it must be hard to find any x such
that f(x) = y.
Viewing f as a random function (as in the random ora-
cle model for hash functions), it follows that finding such
a preimage x takes 2128/n time approximately. If n = 1
this is simply the problem of inverting f , which can only
be solved by making random guesses for x; on each at-
tempt one succeeds with probability 1/2128. For n > 1,
however, one should not guess randomly. First, observe
that the set of nth iterate images y (range of fn) is much
smaller than {0, 1}128. In fact, the expected number of
nth iterate images y is equal to (1− τn)2
128, where τ0 = 0,
τn = e
−1+τn−1 for n ≥ 1 [4, Theorem 2(v)]. To take ad-
vantage of the given that y is not just any image but an
nth iterate image, start with a random guess x0 and then
check if x1 = f(x0) happens to match y. Next, compute
x2 = f(x1) and again test for equality with y, and con-
tinue to do so until xn is reached. The overall probability
of hitting y and thus obtaining a preimage of y as well
works out as n/2128 approximately. Hence, even for very
long chains of length n = 232, say, the security level is still
296. See also [8, Theorem 3] for a further analysis.
Pebbling algorithms
The above provides a solid basis for Jakobsson’s wonderful
idea of using efficient pebbling algorithms to make Lam-
port’s scheme practical even for very long chains [11].
Naive implementations would render Lamport’s scheme
completely impractical: both (i) computing xn−1 =
fn−1(x0) to perform the first round of identification, then
computing xn−2 = f
n−2(x0) from scratch, and so on,
and (ii) storing all of x0, x1, . . . , xn−2, xn−1 to perform
each round of identification instantly, are out of the ques-
tion. The crux of Jakobsson’s pebbling algorithm is to
achieve a good space-time trade-off: for chains of length
n = 2k, Jakobsson’s algorithm stores O(log n) hash val-
ues throughout, and the maximum number of hashes per-
formed in any round of identification is O(log n) as well.
Each hash value stored is associated with a pebble. For
a length-16 chain, 5 pebbles are initially arranged as fol-
lows, which is typical of a binary pebbling algorithm:
x0
•
x1
·
x2
·
x3
·
x4
·
x5
·
x6
·
x7
·
x8
•
x9
·
x10
·
x11
·
x12
•
x13
·
x14
•
x15
•
The general pattern is that starting from the rightmost
pebble, the distance to the next pebble doubles each time.
From this initial arrangement, the first two elements x15
and x14 of the reverse of {x0, x1, . . . , x15} can be output
directly. For the third element x13 we need to apply f
once to recompute it from x12. The fourth element x12
can be output again without any effort.
To produce x11, something interesting happens. Be-
cause f is one-way, the only sensible option is to recompute
it from x8 as x11 = f
3(x8). But while doing so, the value
of x10 = f
2(x8) is also stored for later use. Hence, just
before x11 is output, the pebbles are arranged as follows:
x0
•
x1
·
x2
·
x3
·
x4
·
x5
·
x6
·
x7
·
x8
•
x9
·
x10
•
x11
•
Proceeding this way and computing outputs just-in-time,
the rushing binary pebbling algorithm Rk is obtained:
R0(x) = output x
Rk(x) = Rk−1(f
2k−1(x));Rk−1(x).
The reader may check that Rk(x) outputs the sequence
f∗k (x) = {f
i(x)}2
k
−1
i=0
in reverse, using k2k−1 hashes in total. In addition, the
storage requirements are low: Rk(x) needs to store x for
the recursive call Rk−1(x) later on, which leads to a max-
imum of k + 1 values stored (pebbles) at any moment.
The only drawback is that Rk in the worst case requires
time exponential in k between producing successive out-
puts. Removing these slow rounds is exactly what makes
the problem non-trivial. That is, we seek a way to re-
verse f∗k (x) satisfying the performance constraints of using
O(k) storage (pebbles) and using O(k) applications of f
(hashes) between producing any two successive outputs.
To study this problem we introduce a specific framework
for binary pebbling algorithms that operate in rounds.
At this point we like to mention that there are many
similar notions of “pebbling” in the literature. In particu-
lar, pebbling games (see, e.g., [16]) are somewhat related,
and have recently been used in the context of cryptogra-
phy to prove memory-hardness of certain hash functions
[1]. Graph pebbling is another well-known problem (see,
e.g., [9]). Reversible computing (see, e.g., [18]) gives rise
to even more uses of pebbling (a.k.a. “checkpointing”, see
below). As discussed in [20], however, the specific worst-
case constraint limiting the number of hashes per round
is unique to the cryptographic setting, starting with the
work in [10, 11].
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xPk−1
Pk−2
Initial stage:
- set yi = f
2k−2i(x),
for i = k, . . . , 0,
using tk,r hashes
in round r ∈ [1, 2k).
Output stage:
- output y0 in round r = 2
k;
- run Pi−1(yi) in parallel,
for i = 1, . . . , k,
in rounds r ∈ (2k, 2k+1).
•
yk •
yk−1 •
yk−2• •
y0•
−
−
−
r = 1
r = 2k
r = 2k+1−1
rT4 S4
rushing
pebbler P4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
115 •
5W4 • • • • •
41 • • • •
40 • • • •
33 • • •
40 • • • •
31 • • •
30 • • •
27 • •
40 • • • •
31 • • •
30 • • •
23 • •
30 • • •
21 • •
20 • •
10 •
Figure 1. (left) Binary pebbler Pk(x) for schedule Tk = {tk,r}
2k−1
r=1 satisfying
∑2k−1
r=1 tk,r = 2
k − 1.
(right) Schedule T4, work W4, and storage S4 for rushing pebbler P4 in rounds r = 1 to r = 31. Bullets
represent stored values (pebbles), rightwards arrows represent hashing, vertical lines represent copying.
Framework for binary pebbling
For k ≥ 0, pebbler Pk(x) will be defined as an algorithm
that runs for 2k+1 − 1 rounds in total, and outputs f∗k (x)
in reverse in its last 2k rounds. It is essential that we in-
clude the initial 2k − 1 rounds (in which no outputs are
produced) as an integral part of Pk(x), as this allows for a
fully recursive definition and analysis of binary pebbling.
In fact, in terms of a given schedule Tk = {tk,r}
2k−1
r=1 ,
which fixes the number of hashes for each initial round, a
binary pebbler Pk(x) is completely specified by the re-
cursive definition given in Figure 1. This means, for exam-
ple, that P0(x) runs for one round only outputting y0 = x
itself, and that P1(x) will run for three rounds, performing
t1,1 = 1 hash in its first round, outputting y0 = f(x) in
its second round, and outputting y1 = x in its last round.
In general, Pk(x) computes f
2k−1(x) using exactly 2k − 1
hashes in total in its initial stage, storing only the values
yk, . . . , y0 along the way. Running pebblers Pk−1, . . . , P0
in parallel in the output stage means that pebblers take
turns to execute for one round each, where the order in
which this happens within a round is irrelevant. It is not
hard to prove that in every round exactly one of the peb-
blers running in parallel will be in its first output round,
and that the sequence of outputs is always equal to f∗k (x).
Schedule Tk specifies the number of hashes for the ini-
tial stage of Pk. To analyze the work done by Pk in its
output stage, we let sequence Wk of length 2
k − 1 denote
the number of hashes performed by Pk in each of its last
2k − 1 rounds—noting that by definition no hashes are
performed by Pk in round 2
k. The following recurrence
relation for Wk will be useful throughout:
W0 = {}, Wk = Tk−1 +Wk−1 ‖ {0} ‖ Wk−1,
where Tk−1 +Wk−1 denotes elementwise addition of Tk−1
and Wk−1 and ‖ concatenation of sequences (+ takes
precedence over ‖).
To analyze the storage needed by Pk the number of
hash values stored by Pk will be counted for each round.
We let sequence Sk = {sk,r}
2k+1−1
r=1 denote the total stor-
age used by Pk at the start of each round. For instance,
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sk,1 = 1 as Pk only stores x at the start, and sk,2k = k+1
as Pk stores y0, . . . , yk at the start of round 2
k independent
of schedule Tk.
The rushing pebbler Pk corresponding to Rk introduced
above is obtained by taking schedule Tk with tk,2k−1 =
2k− 1 and tk,r = 0 elsewhere. Rushing pebbler P4 is illus-
trated in Figure 1 in our framework for binary pebbling.
The storage S4 is minimal throughout, but for the work
W4 there are big peaks: e.g., in round 23, in total 7 hashes
are performed, while the pebbler is idle in all even rounds.
Towards optimal solution
As it turns out, our framework admits a simple solu-
tion obtained by taking schedule Tk = {1}
2k−1
r=1 , result-
ing in the speed-1 pebbler illustrated in Figure 2. The
above recurrence relation for Wk yields max(Wk) = k − 1
for k ≥ 1, and it can also be shown that max(Sk) =
max(k + 1, 2k − 2) = O(k). The speed-1 pebbler thus
achieves the desired asymptotic bounds. For practical pur-
poses, however, further savings are needed to limit the
costs as much as possible. E.g., to enable a lightweight
client device to identify itself every half hour for a period
of three years using a length-216 chain.
Jakobsson’s pebbling algorithm [11] provides a clever
way to cut storage max(Sk) in half essentially. Trans-
lated to our framework for binary pebbling, the corre-
sponding schedule Tk is obtained by setting tk,r = 0 for
1 ≤ r < 2k−1, tk,r = 2 for 2
k−1 ≤ r < 2k − 1, and
tk,2k−1 = 1. The pebbler obtained this way is called the
speed-2 pebbler, illustrated in Figure 2.
Compared to a speed-1 pebbler, the crucial idea of a
speed-2 pebbler is to remain idle for the first half of the
initial stage—preventing that too many pebblers are active
at the same time—and then make up for this by hashing
at double speed in the remaining time. It can be proved
that max(Wk) = k − 1 for k ≥ 1 also holds for a speed-
2 pebbler, but compared to a speed-1 pebbler storage is
now reduced by 50%, achieving max(Sk) = k + 1. For bi-
nary pebbling algorithms, storage Sk of up to k + 1 hash
values is optimal, since this amount of storage is already
needed during the first output round r = 2k, for any bi-
nary pebbler Pk. The interesting question is whether the
work max(Wk) can be reduced any further?
Optimal binary pebbling
An elementary analysis yields max(Wk) ≥ ⌈k/2⌉, k ≥ 2,
as lower bound for any binary pebbling algorithm (see [20,
Theorem 2]). So, the best that can be achieved is to re-
duce the maximum number of hashes for any output round
to k/2 roughly. The problem of optimally efficient hash
chain reversal was extensively studied by Coppersmith and
Jakobsson [3]. They achieved nearly optimal space-time
complexity for a complicated pebbling algorithm using
k+⌈log2(k+1)⌉ pebbles and no more than ⌊
k
2⌋ hashes per
round. Hence, an excess storage of approximately log2 k
hash values compared to optimal binary pebbling.
Fortunately, Yum et al. [21] observed that a greedy im-
plementation of Jakobsson’s original pebbling algorithm
already achieves the optimal space-time trade-off for bi-
nary pebbling. Their idea is to greedily use up a budget
of ⌈k2 ⌉ hashes per round subject to the constraint that no
more than about k hash values are stored at any time. The
only drawback of the greedy approach is that no apparent
structure is revealed.
In contrast, we have found an explicit, essentially
unique solution for optimal binary pebbling, which leads
to a complete understanding of the problem and paves
the way for fully optimized in-place implementations. As
a closed formula, the optimal schedule Tk is obtained by
setting tk,r = 0 for 1 ≤ r < 2
k−1, and setting tk,r to⌊
1
2
(
(k + r) mod 2 + k + 1− len((2r) mod 2len(2
k
−r))
)⌋
for 2k−1 ≤ r < 2k, where len(n) denotes the bit length of
nonnegative integer n. Optimal pebbler P4 is illustrated
in Figure 2, which uses the following optimal schedules:
T0 = {},
T1 = {1},
T2 = {0, 1, 2},
T3 = {0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 2},
T4 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3}.
In general, an optimal pebbler Pk will use up to
max(Wk) = ⌈k/2⌉ hashes in any output round. For
the optimal pebbler P4 in Figure 2, this works out as
max(W4) = 2 hashes, compared to the speed-2 pebbler
P4 which needs 3 hashes in output round r = 21.
The fractal nature of the optimal schedule Tk is revealed
by the recursive characterization in terms of sequences
Uk, Vk defined in Table 1. These sequences are defined over
1
2Z—rather than over Z as will ultimately be required for
use in a pebbling algorithm. Without rounding of these
half-integers, the optimal schedule satisfies the following
key equation in terms of sequences Uk, Vk, k ≥ 2:
(Uk ‖ Vk) + ({0} ‖ Wk−1) = {
k+1
2 }
2k−1 .
This equation basically says that the optimal schedule does
not leave any gaps: in each round exactly the maximum
number of hashes are performed to meet the lower bound
for binary pebbling.
Efficient in-place implementations
Without strict performance requirements, our framework
for binary pebbling allows for relatively straightforward
implementations. Figure 4 is showcasing a conceptually
simple implementation based on Python generators. For
demonstration purposes, we are using MD5 as a 128-bit
length-preserving one-way function—MD5 is readily avail-
able in Python, also no practical attacks against the one-
wayness of MD5 are known to this day.
By exploiting specific properties of the optimal sched-
ule, we will next show how to implement binary pebblers
with minimal overhead. In fact, we present in-place hash
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rT4S4
speed-1
pebbler P4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
11 •
21 • •
21 • •
21 • •
21 • •
21 • •
21 • •
21 • •
21 • •
31 • • •
31 • • •
31 • • •
31 • • •
41 • • • •
41 • • • •
5W4 • • • • •
43 • • • •
62 • • • • • •
52 • • • • •
51 • • • • •
42 • • • •
51 • • • • •
41 • • • •
40 • • • •
32 • • •
41 • • • •
31 • • •
30 • • •
21 • •
20 • •
10 •
rT4S4
speed-2
pebbler P4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
12 •
22 • •
22 • •
22 • •
22 • •
32 • • •
32 • • •
41 • • • •
5W4 • • • • •
41 • • • •
42 • • • •
41 • • • •
42 • • • •
43 • • • •
42 • • • •
41 • • • •
40 • • • •
31 • • •
32 • • •
31 • • •
30 • • •
21 • •
20 • •
10 •
rT4S4
optimal
pebbler P4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
10 •
12 •
22 • •
21 • •
21 • •
22 • •
22 • •
32 • • •
33 • • •
5W4 • • • • •
41 • • • •
41 • • • •
42 • • • •
42 • • • •
42 • • • •
42 • • • •
42 • • • •
40 • • • •
31 • • •
31 • • •
32 • • •
30 • • •
21 • •
20 • •
10 •
Figure 2. Schedule T4, work W4, storage S4 for three types of binary pebblers P4 in rounds 1–31.
chain reversal algorithms, where the entire state of these
algorithms (apart from the hash values) is represented be-
tween rounds by a single k-bit counter only. Below, this
is shown for Jakobsson’s speed-2 pebblers; refer to [20] for
further results.
We use the following terminology to describe the state
of a pebbler Pk (which applies to both speed-2 pebblers
and optimal pebblers). Pebbler Pk is said to be idle if it
is in rounds [1, 2k−1), hashing if it is in rounds [2k−1, 2k],
and redundant if it is in rounds (2k, 2k+1). An idle peb-
bler performs no hashes at all, while a hashing pebbler will
perform at least one hash per round, except for round 2k in
which Pk outputs its y0 value. The work for a redundant
pebbler Pk is taken over by its child pebblers P0, . . . , Pk−1
during its last 2k − 1 output rounds.
The important observation is that for each round r the
complete state of a pebbler Pk can be deduced quickly
from the binary representation of the counter c = 2k+1−r,
which counts down how many rounds are still left. This
is illustrated in Figure 3 for a speed-2 pebbler Pk(x). The
pseudocode shows how to run the pebbler in-place, that
is, in such a way that the storage between rounds is lim-
ited to a length-k array z of hash values and counter r.
The information about the states of all pebblers running
in parallel is deduced directly from c. This information
includes which pebblers are present, whether these peb-
blers are idle or hashing, which hash values have already
been computed by a pebbler, and where these are stored
in array z, etc.
The example in Figure 3 shows the details for a P9 peb-
bler at round r = 664. Four child pebblers P8, P6, P5, P3
Table 1. Recursive definition of optimal schedule Tk = {0}
2k−1−1 ‖Uk ‖Vk over
1
2Z (no rounding).
Explicit formula is in this case given by Tk = {0}
2k−1−1 ‖ { 12 (k + 1− len((2r) mod 2
len(2k−r)))}2
k
−1
r=2k−1
.
U2 = {
3
2}, Uk = Uk−1 +
1
2 ‖ {1}
2k−3 V2 = {
3
2}, Vk = Uk−1 +
1
2 ‖ Vk−1 +
1
2
U3 21 V3 22
U4
5
2
3
211 V4
5
2
3
2
5
2
5
2
U5 32
3
2
3
21111 V5 32
3
2
3
23233
U6
7
2
5
222
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
211111111 V6
7
2
5
222
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
7
2
5
222
7
2
5
2
7
2
7
2
U7 43
5
2
5
22222
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
21111111111111111 V7 43
5
2
5
22222
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
3
243
5
2
5
2222243
5
2
5
24344
avg. speed 2 speed 1 avg. speed 2 avg. speed 3
5
Round r:
1: output z[0]
2: c← 2k+1 − r
3: i← pop0(c)
4: z[0, i)← z[1, i]
5: i← i + 1; c← ⌊c/2⌋
6: q ← i− 1
7: while c 6= 0 do
8: z[q]← f(z[i])
9: if q 6= 0 then z[q]← f(z[q])
10: i← i + pop0(c) + pop1(c)
11: q ← i
c8 c7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1 c0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
P hashing8/y8/y7
P idle6/y6
P hashing5/y5/y4
P hashing3/y3/y2/y1/y0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
P hashing8/y8/y7
P idle6/y6
P hashing5/y5/y4/y3
P idle2/y2
P idle1/y1
P hashing0/y0
z[8] z[7] z[6] z[5] z[4] z[3] z[2] z[1] z[0]
P state
i/hash values
: Pi with state and hash values stored in array z
pop0(c) / pop1(c): count and remove trailing 0-bits / 1-bits from c
Figure 3. (left) Pseudocode for in-place speed-2 pebbler Pk(x) at output round r, 2
k < r < 2k+1.
Initially, array z[0, k) satisfies z[i−1] = f2
k
−2i(x) for i = 1, . . . , k. (right) Transition of P9 from round
r = 664 to r = 665, hence from c = 360 = (101101000)2 to c = 359 = (101100111)2.
are running in parallel: P8 is hashing and has entries z[7, 8]
in use, P6 is idle occupying one entry z[6], P5 is hashing
and has entries z[4, 5] in use. The P3 pebbler has just
reached its first output round occupying four entries z[0, 3]
and outputs its y0 value stored in z[0]. Subsequently, this
P3 pebbler becomes redundant and is replaced by its child
pebblers P2, P1, P0, which will each use one entry of array
z. Entry z[3] has been freed, but is immediately used again
by the P5 pebbler, which just reached the point where it
starts working on its y3 value.
The schedule for a speed-2 pebbler is integrated in the
pseudocode of Figure 3. For optimal pebbling, however,
we need to evaluate the formula for the optimal schedule
to find the exact number of hashes to be performed by
each pebbler. An intuitive way to interpret this formula is
explained by means of the following example, cf. Figure 3.
Consider optimal pebbler P9 at c = 360 rounds from the
end:
c8 c7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1 c0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
P hashing8 P
hashing
5
The formula of Table 1 for the optimal schedule (before
rounding) partitions the bits of c into the two colored
segments as indicated. The underlying rule is as follows.
First, all the hashing pebblers are identified, ignoring the
rightmost one: this results in two hashing pebblers P8
and P5 (idle pebbler P6 and the rightmost hashing peb-
bler P3 are ignored). Then, each of these hashing pebblers
Pi gets the segment assigned starting at bit ci and extend-
ing to the right. The number of hashes to be performed by
each of these hashing pebblers—as given by the formula of
the optimal schedule—exactly matches the length of these
segments divided by 2. In case of P8 this works out as
3
2
hashes, and for P5 we get
6
2 hashes, hence exactly
9
2 hashes
are used in total for this round.
In general, this rule implies that no more than k2 hashes
are performed in any output round of Pk. Moreover, this
simple rule will orchestrate the entire computation, ensur-
ing that all intermediate hash values are computed right
on time—not too late to fail producing an output on time,
and not too early, before another free entry in array z[0, k)
becomes available. The optimized implementations in [20]
are based on this rule.
Lower bound
Optimal binary pebbling achieves a space-time product of
0.50k2 for a chain of length n = 2k. In an upcoming pa-
per with Niels de Vreede, we will show how to reduce the
space-time product to 0.46k2 by means of Fibonacci peb-
bling (see also [20]) and how to reduce this even further
down to just 0.37k2 by more intricate pebbling algorithms.
We note that Coppersmith and Jakobsson [3] gave a lower
bound of 0.25k2, but whether this bound can be attained is
doubtful: the lower bound is derived without taking into
account any limits on the number of hashes per output
round.
Incidentally, the lower bound of 0.25k2 had been found
already in a completely different context [7], for a simi-
lar problem studied in the area of algorithmic (or, auto-
matic, computational) differentiation [6]. The lower bound
applies to the space-time complexity of so-called check-
pointing for the reverse (or, adjoint, backward) mode of
algorithmic differentiation. In contrast to our case, how-
ever, there it is even possible to attain the lower bound
[5]. The critical difference is that in the setting of al-
gorithmic differentiation the goal is basically to minimize
the total time for performing this task (or, equivalently,
to minimize the amortized time per output round). This
contrasts sharply with the goal in the cryptographic set-
ting, where we want to minimize the worst case time per
output round while performing this task.
6
import hashlib , itertools
f = lambda x: hashlib .md5(x).digest()
tR = lambda k, r : 0 if r < 2∗∗k− 1 else 2∗∗k− 1
t1 = lambda k, r : 1
t2 = lambda k, r : 0 if r < 2∗∗(k−1) else 2 if r < 2∗∗k− 1 else 1
tS = lambda k, r : 0 if r < 2∗∗(k−1) else ((k + r) % 2 + k + 1− ((2 ∗ r) % (2∗∗(2∗∗k− r).bit length())).bit length()) // 2
def P(k,x):
y = [None] ∗ k + [x]
i = k; g = 0
for r in range(1, 2∗∗k):
for in range(t(k, r)):
z = y[ i ]
if g == 0: i−= 1; g = 2∗∗i
y[ i ] = f(z)
g−= 1
yield
yield y[0]
for v in itertools .zip longest(∗(P(i−1, y[ i ]) for i in range(1, k+1))):
yield next( fi lter (None, v))
t = eval(input())
k = int(input())
x = f(b’ ’)
for v in P(k,x):
if v: print(v.hex())
Figure 4. Python program for recursive binary pebblers without any optimizations, cf. definition of
Pk(x) in Fig. 1. Inputs: tR/t1/t2/tS for rushing/speed-1/speed-2/optimal and nonnegative integer k.
P(k,x) is a Python generator: each evaluation of a yield expression corresponds to a round of Pk(x).
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